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Abstract. We define balance games, which describe the formation of friendships
and enmity in social networks. We show that if the agents give high priority to
future profits over short term gains, all Pareto optimal strategies will eventually
result in a balanced network. If, on the other hand, agents prioritize short term
gains over the long term, every Nash equilibrium eventually results in a network
that is stable but that might not be balanced.
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1 Introduction
A social network consists of a number of agents and positive or negative relations be-
tween them. The agents could be countries, individuals or groups. A positive relation
represents a friendship or alliance, while a negative relation represents an enmity or
rivalry. Structural balance theory describes such networks, and was introduced by Hei-
der [15,16] and later generalized by Cartwright and Harary [11,12,3]. It argues that
certain patterns are likely to occur while other patterns are unlikely; the likely patterns
are referred to as balanced while the unlikely ones are unbalanced. There is also em-
pirical support for the assertion that networks tend towards balance, see for example
[25,27], though a fully balanced network is not always (nor easily) reached [18].
Usually, balance theory describes a network as a whole; it is claimed (quite con-
vincingly) that networks usually become more balanced over time, but relatively little
attention is paid to the actions and motivations of individual agents on the way towards
balance. Here, we take a different, game-theoretical approach: we explicitly treat the
tendency towards balance as evidence for a preference by agents for balanced states
over unbalanced ones. This allows us to take a detailed look at how this tendency fol-
lows the result of rational choices by the individual agents.
We introduce a class of balance games, which are multi-stage games where in each
stage one agent updates their relationship with someone else, and all agents prefer being
involved in balanced relations over unbalanced ones. We show that if the agents are
sufficiently patient (i.e., if the discount factor δ is high enough), any Pareto optimal
strategy profile will, with probability 1, eventually result in a balanced network. If the
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agents are less patient, the end result may not be a balanced network. In fact, we show
that for sufficiently impatient agents (i.e., if the discount factor δ is low enough), any
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy profile will, with probability 1, result in a
network that need not be balanced but that is stable. Stability was defined by Van der
Hoek et al. [17] and is related to but strictly weaker than balance.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first give definitions for balance, stability
and the balance game in Section 2, where we also present a few useful lemmas, give an
example, and discuss related work. Then, in Section 3 we consider the case of patient
agents, and show that for them every Pareto optimal strategy profile results in balance.
In Sections 4 we study the cases of impatient agents. In Section 5 we discuss some
generalizations as well as some limitations of our results. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Definitions and Preliminaries
In this section we first provide definitions of social balance theory, including structural
balance and stability. Most of these are from the literature (mainly [3] and [17]). We give
examples and introduce some results which will be used in later proofs. We then move
on to define a class of balance games and some relevant notions. We use an example to
explain the idea of balance games. We then discuss related approaches.
2.1 Structural balance and stability
A (social) network is an irreflexive, complete, signed and undirected graph, i.e., a pair
(A,E) such that A is a finite set of agents (represented by vertices of a graph), and
E : {{i, j} ⊆ A | i 6= j} → {+,−} is an edge function that assigns to each unordered
pair of different agents a positive (+) or a negative (−) edge. For simplicity, for pairs
of agents we write ij, ik, etc, and for triads we write ijk, ijl, etc. We only consider
graphs with at least three agents.
Balance Given a networkN = (A,E), a triad ijk ofN is called balanced, if the labels
of its edges are of one of the types +++ or +−− up to isomorphism. So in a balanced
triad there is an even number of negative edges. The unbalanced triads therefore have
either of the other two types: ++− or −−−. A network is balanced, if all of its triads
are balanced, and unbalanced otherwise.
In a triad of the type −−−, all three agents are enemies of one another. In that
situation, it is likely that two of them will set aside their differences and unite against
their common foe. Doing so would turn the triad into+−−, which is balanced. In a triad
++−, there is one agent i that is friends with both j and k, while j and k are enemies.
It is then likely that one of two things will happen: either the mutual friendship with
i will form a basis for reconciliation between j and k, resulting in the balanced triad
+++, or the tension between j and k will force i to end its friendship with one of them,
resulting in the balanced triad +−−. So both types of unbalanced triad have a tendency
to evolve into a balanced triad.
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Stability In addition to balance, we will also use the weaker notion of stability, which is
defined in terms of mutual and anti-mutual ties. For a pair ij of a network N = (A,E),
a mutual tie of ij is an agent k of N such that k is a mutual friend or mutual enemy of
i and j, i.e., either E(ik) = E(jk) = + or E(ik) = E(jk) = −.
An anti-mutual tie of ij is an agent k of N such that k is either a friend of i and an
enemy of j, or an enemy of i and a friend of j, i.e., if one of the following is true:
– E(ik) = + and E(jk) = −
– E(ik) = − and E(jk) = +.
We say an pair ij is stable, if it is one of the following cases:
– E(ij) = + and ij has at least as many mutual ties as anti-mutual ties;
– E(ij) = − and ij has at least as many anti-mutual ties as mutual ties.
Finally, a network is stable, if all of its pairs are stable.
A mutual tie is a reason to stay or become friends, while an anti-mutual tie is a
reason to stay or become enemies. A network is therefore stable if every pair of friends
has at least as many reasons to remain friends as to become enemies, and every pair of
enemies has at least as many reasons to remain hostile as to become friends.
Balance vs. stability If ijk is a balanced triad and E(ij) = +, then k is a mutual
tie for ij. Specifically, if ijk is of type +++ then k is a mutal friend, and if ijk is of
type +−− then k is a mutual foe. Likewise, if ijk is balanced and E(ij) = −, then k
is an anti-mutual tie for ij. A balanced network is therefore a stable network with the
additional property that for all pairs ij, if E(ij) = + then ij has only mutual ties and
if E(ij) = − then ij has only anti-mutual ties.
Not all stable networks are balanced, however. Two typical examples of stable net-









k1 · · · km
i j
l1 · · · lm
(c) N(m)
Fig. 1: Stable networks that are unbalanced, where a solid line stands for a positive edge
and the lack of a line for a negative edge.
In Figure 1(a), one can verify that every pair has an equal number of mutual and
anti-mutual ties. For instance, pair {1, 3} has two mutual ties (i.e., agents 4 and 5) and
two anti-mutual ties (i.e., agents 2 and 6). It is therefore stable, and so is the entire
network. Yet the network is not balanced, for, e.g., the triad {1, 2, 3} is not balanced.
Similarly, the network of Figure 1(b) is also stable but not balanced.
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The benefit of the latter network is that it can be generalized to a class of stable and
unbalanced networks illustrated in Figure 1(c). For each natural number m ≥ 2, the
network N(m) can be divided into three cliques: the {k1, . . . , km}-party (k-party for
short), the {l1, . . . , lm}-party (l-party for short) which are of equal size, and a small,
third party {i, j}. Agents are friendly towards members of their own clique and hostile
towards members of other cliques. The network shown in 1(b) is N(2).
One can verify that for any pair {kx, ky}, {lx, ly} or {i, j} in the same party, there
are 2mmutual ties (i.e., all others are their mutual ties), and is therefore stable. Any pair
{kx, lx} across the two major parties are stable, as there are 2 mutual ties (i.e., i and j)
and (2m − 2) anti-mutual ties. Any pair {i, kx}, {i, lx}, {j, kx} or {j, lx} across the
third party and a major party has an equal number (i.e., m) of mutual and anti-mutual
ties, and is thus stable as well. For every m ≥ 2, the network N(m) is therefore stable.
It is not balanced, however, because it contains triads of the type −−−.
Let us consider a few technical lemmas that will be useful later on. The first lemma
is well known in balance theory, and follows immediately from the fact that a triad is
balanced if and only if it contains an even number of negative edges.
Lemma 1. If a triad ijk is balanced, then flipping (the sign of) any single edge of the
triad will make it unbalanced. Likewise, if ijk is unbalanced then flipping any single
edge of the triad will make it balanced.
A pair ij is stable if and only if it is part of at least as many balanced triads as unbalanced
triads. The following lemma therefore follows from Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. If a pair ij is stable, then flipping E(ij) does not increase the number of
balanced triads containing i, nor does it decrease the number of unbalanced triads
containing i.
If a pair ij is unstable, then flipping E(ij) will strictly increase the number of
balanced triads in the network.
Finally, we need a lemma that is new in this paper.
Lemma 3. For any network, if there is an unbalanced triad, then all agents occur in
an unbalanced triad.
Proof. If ijk contains an odd number of negative edges, then for every agent l 6∈
{i, j, k} at least one of lij, ljk or lik also has an odd number of negative edges.
2.2 Balance games
We study structural balance from the viewpoint of game theory, by introducing a bal-
ance game which is a type of multi-stage game of infinitely many stages. All the agents
in a network are players of a balance game. Each agent is better off if it is involved in
more balanced triads.
Valuation Given a networkN , the valuation for an agent i in that network is the number
of balanced triads i is part of minus the number of unbalanced triads it is part of. This
valuation is denoted vali(N).
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Actions At every stage of the game, a single agent (chosen uniformly at random) will be
given an opportunity to change one of its relations. This agent can choose to change its
relation to one other agent, or it can choose to pass and leave all relations unchanged.
Note that an agent can only change those relations that it is involved in. Agent i can
decide to become enemies with j, but i cannot choose to create an enmity between j
and k—although i might be able to create a situation where j and k have an incentive
to become enemies.
In a balanced network all triads are balanced, so balance is a global optimum of
vali for every i. In a stable network no single change to any relation ij would result in
an increase in the number of balanced triads for either i or j (see Lemma 2). So stability
is a local optimum of vali for every i.
Cost of change If an agent decides to change a relation, it will incur a cost of change.
This cost represents the effort and social cost associated with changing one’s relation to
another agent. For example, deciding to end an enmity might require an apology and a
good bottle of wine, whereas ending a friendship may reduce one’s social capital.
The exact value that this cost of change should have can be debated. We believe that
it should lie in the open interval (0, 2). In order to keep all calculations as simple as
possible we prefer to have an integer cost of change, so we set it to be 1. See Section 5
for a discussion of why we believe that the cost of change should be between 0 and 2,
and an overview of how any cost of change in the interval [0,∞) would influence our
results.
Discount factor At every stage of the game, the agents immediately receive utility
equal to their valuation of the current network. This rewards them for having more bal-
anced relations and punishes them for unbalanced ones. Additionally, they receive util-
ity from future game stages. A reward today is worth more than the same reward tomor-
row, however, so the agents multiply their future utility by a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
The value of δ indicates the kind of agents that are being modeled; patient agents place
(relatively) high value on the future and therefore have a high value for δ, impatient
agents prioritize short term gain and therefore have a low value for δ. The utility for
agent i in a network N therefore equals vali(N) plus δ times the expected utility in the
successor network (minus the cost of change, if applicable).
We consider only memoryless pure strategies, so a strategy for an agent i can be
represented by a function that maps every network to either a single change in a relation
for i or to no change. Below we introduce the formal definitions. We assume a fixed set
of agentsA = {1, . . . , n}with n ≥ 3, and useN to denote the set of all social networks
over A.
Definition 1. The balance game over a network N = (A,E) is a pair (N, s) given by
– (Players) A is the set of players.
– (Strategies) s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a strategy profile, such that for every player i,
si : N→{(+, i, j), (−, i, j) | j ∈ A\{i}} is a strategy for i.
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k1 · · · km
i j
l1 · · · lm
(a) A balanced outcome
of N(m) where i and j
take the same side.
k1 · · · km
i j
l1 · · · lm
(b) A balanced outcome
of N(m) where i and j
take different sides.
k1 · · · km
i j
l1 · · · lm
(c) A successor of N(m)
where i and k1 become
friends.
Fig. 2: Possible evolutions of the network N(m) from Figure 1(c).
– (Outcomes) The outcome of (N, s) is one of {(Nsi , s) | i ∈ A}, chosen uniformly
at random, where Nsi = (A,Esi) is given by
Esi(kl) =
+, if si(N) = (+, i, j) and kl = ij,−, if si(N) = (−, i, j) and kl = ij,
E(kl), otherwise.
– (Utility) The utility function u = (u1, . . . , un), where ui is the utility of player i, is
given recursively by
ui(N, s) = vali(N) + δ · 1
n
· (∑j∈A ui(Nsj , s)− cj),
where cj = 1 if i = j and N 6= Nsj , and cj = 0 otherwise.
The recursive definition of utility does not immediately provide a practical way
to compute ui(N, s). It is therefore useful to also have a direct characterization of
ui(N, s). For this purpose, we use the concept of timelines. Given a strategy pro-
file s, an s-timeline is an infinite sequence l = 〈N0, N1, . . .〉 such that for every




t(vali(Nt)−c), where c = 1 if i brought about a change fromNt−1
to Nt and c = 0 otherwise. The utility ui(N, s) is then simply the expected value of
{ui(l) | l = 〈N,N1, . . .〉 is an s-timeline}.
For a given s-timeline l = 〈N0, N1, . . .〉, if there is a natural number T such that
Nt1 = Nt2 for all t1, t2 ≥ T , then we say l finalizes in NT , or NT is the final of l.
We write N ;i N ′ if there is a strategy si for agent i such that N ′ = Nsi , and we
write N ; N ′ if there is at least one i such that N ;i N ′.
As usual, we say a strategy profile is Pareto optimal (or simply, optimal) if there
is no other strategy profile with which all players receive no less utility and at least
one player gets a higher utility. A strategy profile is called a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (or simply, an equilibrium), if no player could obtain a higher utility in any
network by unilaterally changing its strategy.
2.3 Example
Consider the network N(m) for a given m ≥ 2 as depicted in Figure 1(c). In this
network, most triads are balanced, but some remain unbalanced: the triads ikl and jkl
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are unbalanced for every k ∈ {k1, . . . , km} and every l ∈ {l1, . . . , lm}, since those
triads are of the form −−−.
The agents could choose to pass, leaving the network in the state N(m) forever.
Alternatively, the agents could take actions that change the network. Taking such an
action would incur a cost of change, however, so a rational agent will only do so in the
expectation of a sufficiently high reward later. The main reward which all agents would
like to obtain (although they may or may not be willing to pay the price for doing so)
would be a balanced network.
There are many ways in whichN(m) can be changed to a balanced network. For ex-
ample, all agents could decide to become friends with one another. That change would
be very costly, however. Rational agents would instead aim for a balanced state that is
easier to reach. A more feasible way to reach balance would be for the agents i and j to
join the k-party or l-party, as shown in Figures 2(a) and 2(b).
Suppose that i joins the k-party. So eventually i will become friends with every
agent kx. Then at first, a friendship between i and some agent kx must form. With-
out loss of generality, we can assume that this first friendship is with k1, as shown in
Figure 2(c). Consider the effect this has on the valuation of the different agents. Triads
ik1ky and ik1j used to be of the form +−− but are now ++−. So they have turned
from balanced to unbalanced. Triads ik1ly , on the other hand, used to be −−− and
have become +−−, so they have turned from unbalanced to balanced. All other triads
are unaffected. In total, there are m − 1 triads ik1ky , 1 triad ik1ky and m triads ik1ly .
So the number of triads that become balanced and the number of triads that become
unbalanced are both m.
The agents i and k1 are part of all triads that change, so their valuation is unchanged.
One of them does have to pay the cost of change, but they suffer no harm from the
change in the network. Agents ly are part of one triad that changes, and it turns balanced.
So their valuation increases, without them having to take any action. They quite like this
change. The agents j and ky are less happy, however: they too are part of one triad that
changes, but theirs turns unbalanced. So they lose out due to this new friendship.
Once this first friendship has been established, all other members of the k-clique
have an incentive to follow k1 and become friends with i as well: currently, k1kyi if of
the type ++−, but by becoming friends with i they can turn this into the balanced type
+++. So the first friendship ik1 is likely to be followed by a flood of new friendships
between i and the members of the k-party. Every such new friendship will be welcomed
by the l-party, by i and by all ky that are already friends with i, since it makes their
relations more balanced. For those ky that are not yet friends with i, the situation turns
even worse, however. Every time an agent kx becomes friends with i, the triad ikykx
becomes unbalanced, depriving ky of another 2 points of valuation. In particular, if km
is the last agent to become friends with i then just before they do so their valuation is
2(m− 1) lower than it was in N(m). Eventually, however, the network reaches one of
the balanced states depicted in Figure 2, at which point all temporary losses are wiped
away and replaced by the benefits of being part of a balanced network.
For highly impatient agents, paying the initial cost of change is not worth it, so
remaining in N(m) is the only rational option. If agents are more patient, however,
aiming for balance may be the only rational choice. How patient agents have to be in
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order for remaining inN(m) not to be an option depends on whether we are considering
optimal strategy profiles or equilibria. The fact that the agents who are late to become
friends with i (or j) suffer until balance is achieved means that remaining in N(m)
remains optimal until δ becomes very high. But the agents that experience a loss in
valuation are not the ones that take action, it’s the ones that have not yet taken action. So
if the agents are even a little bit patient (δ = 0.5 suffices, for example), the agents who
decide to initiate the friendships will benefit by doing so, thereby making the strategy
of remaining in N(m) not an equilibrium.
2.4 Related work
Our definition of balance is called 3-balance in the classical literature (e.g., [3]), where
the number 3 refers to the length of the cycles to be examined – 3-cycles for triangles.
In general, k-balance of a network requires that all cycles of length up to k contain an
even number of negative edges. There is also pressure of balance from longer cycles,
but it is considered of less effect. This leads to a difference between viewing balance of
networks as a property or a process. Taking the former view, as in the classical literature,
all cycles of all lengths are examined before we can determine the balance of the whole
network. The lesser effect of longer cycles is modeled by assigning a weight or strength
to each length [3,23]. In the latter view as proposed in [17] and adopted in this paper,
however, the balance of a network lies in the balance of its local parts. The balance
of longer cycles is achieved gradually over time by the constraints of balance among
shortest cycles (triads in the case of undirected graphs).
The structure theorem [3,13] states that a balanced network can be partitioned into
two mutually antagonistic and self-solidary components. The structure theorem was
later generalized in [5] to consider a weaker version of balance which corresponds
to more than two partitions. This gives a different way of studying the tendency of
balance: it can be viewed as a process of partitioning a network. This approach has
been developed in [7,8,24].
In recent years the study of link formation has drawn much attention in various
fields including social network analysis, economics, information and computer science.
Some of these are empirical studies that investigate into, say, the formation of social
networks or how technology is adopted in a network [28,4], and some are theoretical
studies that focus on, say, the prediction, formal model, statistical and computational
results of network formation [21,30,29,6]. This paper falls into theoretical side, and
we focus on the formal model of a type of link formation from the viewpoint of game
theory.
The study of structural balance theory has not been limited to a single field since
the very beginning. It was initiated in Heider’s work [15,16] in social psychology and
reinvented by Harary et al. [11,12,3,13] using graph theory. Empirical studies on the
impact of structural balance theory was carried out in the area of social network analysis
(see, e.g., [25,26]). The trend to study and adopt the theory from new perspectives and
in new fields has not come to an end. For example, the impact of structural balance on
opinion formation has been evaluated in the framework of evolutionary games [20]. In
our paper we also have structural balance and games in the same framework, but we
focus more on the theoretical aspects of the structural balance of social networks.
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Another area of related work is that of games on networks, a sub-discipline of game
theory concerned with networks. See for example [22,9,19]. Balance games can be
considered part of this field, but they differ significantly from the games that have been
studied before. Other disciplines of game theory, such as coalition formation and evolu-
tionary games (see, e.g., [31]), are also related to balance games but very different from
a technical point of view.
3 Patient Players
We show that for sufficiently patient players, a Pareto optimal strategy profile finalizes
in a balanced network with probability 1.
Lemma 4. Let s be a strategy profile,N0 a network and L the set of s-timeline starting
in N0 that do not finalize in balance. If L occurs in the game (N0, s) with probability
greater than 0, then there is a δhigh < 1 such that for all δ > δhigh , s is not Pareto
optimal.
Proof. Every agent is part of b := (n−1)·(n−2)2 different triads. In a balanced network,
all triads are balanced so every agent has a valuation of b. In every non-balanced net-
work, every agent has a valuation of at most b − 2, since by Lemma 3 every agent is
part of at least one unbalanced triad.
Let s be any strategy profile that finalizes in a balanced network with probability
1, and s′ any strategy profile that does not. Then after some number of time steps, the
expected valuation under s will be higher than under s′. For sufficiently patient agents,
s therefore Pareto dominates s′.
Theorem 1. For a given number of players, there exists a discount factor δhigh such
that for every δ > δhigh and every Pareto optimal strategy profile s the following hold:
1. every s-timeline that contains a balanced network finalizes in that network;
2. for every N , the game (N, s) reaches a balanced network with probability 1.
Note that the bound δhigh depends on the number of agents. In fact, it can be seen
that limn→∞ δhigh = 1, so the required amount of patience approached 1 as the number
of agents increases.
This can, for example, be seen from the network N(m) depicted in Figure 1(c). In
order for N(m) to become balanced, the central two agents i and j need to join either
the clique k1, . . . , km or the clique l1, . . . , lm. While i is in the process of joining a
clique, those members of the clique that are not yet friends with i experience a loss in
valuation equal to twice the number of agents that are already friends with i. This loss is
temporary, but both its magnitude and its duration increase with the number of agents.
The amount of patience needed for any “go to balance” strategy to beat the “everyone
passes in N(m)” strategy for every agent therefore increase with m.
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4 Impatient Players
Here we show that if the discount factor δ is sufficiently close to 0, then every subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium finalizes in a stable state with probability 1.
Unlike the case for patient agents, where the bound depends on the number of
agents, our bound δlow for impatient agents is constant. More concretely, δlow = 110
suffices.
In order to prove this bound, we first need a few lemmas. For most of these lemmas
the existence of a bound is relatively easy to see, but finding a precise number for
the bound requires a lot of tedious calculations. We therefore do not prove the precise
bound, and only give a qualitative argument for the existence of a bound.
Lemma 5. Let N0 be a network, and let m be the maximum increase of valuation
brought about by any action of agent i, i.e., m = max{vali(N1)− vali(N0) | N0 ;i
N1}. Then for any strategy profile s, any s-timeline 〈N0, N1, N2, . . . 〉 and any t ∈ N
we have val(Nt) ≤ val(N0) + (m+ 2t)t.
Proof. Consider the same action carried out in N0 and Nk. This action will make some
triads balanced, while making others unbalanced. Since N0 and Nk differ in at most k
edges, the number of triads made balanced when performing the action in Nk is at most
k higher than in N0, and the number of triads made unbalanced is at most k lower.
Turning a triad balanced increases valuation by 2, turning it unbalanced decreases
it by 2. So in Nk the action yields at most 2k + 2k more valuation than in N0, where
it yields at most m. So the increase in valuation from Nk to Nk+1 is at most 4k. It
follows that val(Nt) ≤ val(N0) +
∑t−1
k=0(m + 4k) ≤ val(N0) + m · t + 4t2 · t =
val(N0) + (m+ 2t)t.
It follows that for sufficiently small δ, agents will not take any action that would
cause a loss of valuation to them.
Lemma 6. Let δ < 110 and s a Nash equilibrium. Then at every game (N, s), none of
the agents take any action that changes the network unless that action increases their
valuation.
Proof. Taking an action that changes the network will incur the cost of change. An
action that changes the network but does not increase the agent’s valuation therefore
causes a short term loss in utility for that agent. A sufficiently impatient agent will
never take such an action.
Lemma 5 gives an upper bound on the long term benefit of taking a short term
loss. Since this bound does not depend on n, the bound δlow below which agents are
sufficiently impatient does not depend on n either.
Finally, if some agent has a valuation increasing move available, then such a move
will be taken by at least one agent.
Lemma 7. Let δ < 110 and s a Nash equilibrium. Then in every subgame (N, s), if any
agent has an available action that will increase its valuation, then at least one agent
takes an action that increases its valuation.
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Proof. Any action that increases valuation increases it by at least two, so the increase
in valuation outweighs the cost of change, resulting in a short term increase in utility.
Theorem 2. Let δlow = 110 . Then for any discount factor δ < δlow and any subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium s, the following holds:
1. every s-timeline that contains a stable network finalizes in that stable network;
2. for every N , the subgame (N, s) reaches a stable network with probability 1.
Proof. The first part of the theorem follows from Lemma 6. The second part follows
from Lemmas 6 and 7.
5 Discussion
Accuracy Balance theory predicts that social networks broadly tend towards balance,
but that a fully balanced network is not always reached. This is also confirmed by em-
pirical studies. The same general behavior is observed in balance games: rational agents
will generally increase the amount of balance in the network, but under most circum-
stances a fully balanced outcome is not guaranteed.
Whether balance games accurately predict agents’ behaviour on a more detailed
level is not currently known, and remains an interesting question for further research.
Pareto optimality for low δ and subgame perfect Nash Equilibria for high δ Our
results are “asymmetric”, in the sense that δhigh is related to optimality while δlow
is related to equilibria. We conjecture that this asymmetry is fundamental: we think
that for arbitrarily high δ < 1 there remain equilibria that do not finalize in balanced
networks and that for arbitrarily low δ > 0 there remain Pareto optimal strategy profiles
that do not finalize in stable networks. Unfortunately, the strategy space for balance
games is very large and hard to describe. So while we have reasons to believe that
there are no lower bound for optimality and upper bound for equilibria, we have not yet
managed to find the counterexamples that prove this to be the case.
Cost of Change Changing a relation takes some amount of effort, so it should be
associated with some cost c > 0. Furthermore, agents seem willing to incur this cost in
order to make their relations more balanced. This suggests that the increase in valuation
caused by the increase in balance is higher than the cost of change, so c < 2. We
therefore consider values of c outside the interval (0, 2) to be implausible. Still, for the
sake of completeness we explain how out results change for any c ∈ [0,∞).
The bound δhigh is not qualitatively affected by the cost of change: for every c ∈
[0,∞), there is still a bound δhigh above which every optimal solution finalizes in bal-
ance with probability 1 and δhigh approaches 1 as n approaches infinity.
For any c ∈ (0, 2), the bound δlow is also qualitatively unaffected. The exact value
of the bound may change, but a bound δlow still exists and lim
n→∞ δlow > 0.
The first statement of Theorem 2 still applies: every equilibrium timeline that con-
tains a stable network finalizes in that network. But the second part of Theorem 2 does
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not hold for c ∈ (2,∞). If c > 2 and δ is sufficiently low then some timelines finalize
before reaching a stable network.
This leaves the two cases c = 0 and c = 2. If c = 0, then no bound δlow exists: for
every δ ∈ (0, 1) there are equilibria where agents move out of a locally optimal stable
state and eventually reach a globally optimal balanced state. Finally, for c = 2, there is
a bound δlow , but in that case we do not know whether lim
n→∞ δlow = 0.
Complete graphs We assumed all edges to be either positive or negative, unlike some
works on social balance we do not consider neutral relations. This is because for net-
works with neutral edges we do not consider there to be sufficient data to accurately
determine the agents’ preferences.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we viewed structural balance of a social network as a result of its agents
playing a balance game. When the agents are patient, their Pareto optimal strategies
result in a balanced network as the game proceeds. When, on the other hand, the agents
are impatient, their subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategies result in a stable net-
work. By a framework accommodating both the concepts of balance and stability, our
work bridged the classical literature on social balance [3] and its recent development
using a logical approach [17].
There is still work that remains to be done. In particular, while we have shown that
bounds δhigh and δlow exist, we have not yet found tight bounds. Furthermore, as men-
tioned in Section 5, we conjecture that an equilibrium for patient agents may not finalize
in balance and that an optimal profile for impatient agents may not finalize in balance. A
proof (or, for that matter, a disproof) of these conjectures would be interesting. It would
also be good to know more about the behaviour of agents that are neither as patient as
to guarantee balance nor so impatient to guarantee stability.
Additionally, there are a number of further questions related to generalizations of the
balance game. The balance game could, for example, be generalized to different kinds
of networks. These include incomplete networks (were agents i and j may be neither
friends nor foes), weighted networks (where some friendships/enmities are stronger
than others) and directed networks (where i’s relation towards j may be different from
j’s relation towards i).
It should also be interesting to allow different kinds of agents. Some agents might
be more patient than others, or have a higher tolerance for unbalance. The framework
of Boolean games [14,10] seems to be appropriate for modelling the diversity of agents
in their goals.
Another way to increase diversity is in the strategies of agents. By going further
to formalizing the dynamics of balance games in the framework of temporal logic, in
particular, alternating-time temporal logic [1,2], we can get a better characterization
of the time evolution and the flexibility of modeling agent’s strategies in a formal and
unified manner. We leave, however, all these for future work.
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